Plantinga contra evidentialism (part 1)

W.K. Clifford famously asserted that, "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."  Alvin Plantinga famously maintains that one can rationally believe in God without evidence.  In this series, I will examine Plantinga's essay, "The Evidentialist Objection to Theistic Belief" (Religious Experience and Religious Belief, 1986).

First, Plantinga lays out his definition of a properly basic belief as one that can be rightly held without evidence.  But contrary to popular opinion, properly basic beliefs are not gratuitous or groundless (more about this term later).  What criteria determines whether a belief is being rightly held or not?  Many foundationalists maintain something like this:

(C) p is properly basic for S if and only p is self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses of S.

Unfortunately, this claim doesn't satisfy its own conditions for being properly basic (it is neither self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to my senses), so an argument is needed to support it.  In the absence of such arguments, Plantinga concludes that "the classical foundationalist is in self-referential hot water--his own acceptance of the central tenet of his view is irrational by his own standards."

Next, Plantinga examines objections to the Reformed view that belief in God is properly basic.  First, he notes three basic beliefs:

(1) I see a tree.
(2) I had breakfast this morning.
(3) That person is angry.

We will focus on (1) for simplicity.  We can see that a certain sort of experience, perhaps alongside other conditions, justifies one in in believing the proposition expressed by (1).  Here's the trick: some condition(s) attach to these beliefs and Plantinga says they are the ground of its justification; however, he doesn't take the experience of seeing a tree as evidence for (1).  So, why wouldn't Plantinga take my being appeared to treely as evidence for the proposition I see a tree?  Because we don't "infer that belief from others...[or accept it] on the basis of other beliefs."  In other words, we don't refer to any propositional evidence when justifying our beliefs about (1).  Plantinga then construes properly basic belief as follows:

(4) In condition C, S is justified in taking p as basic.  Of course C will vary with p.

C obviously includes the treely appearance, but is that sufficient?  No.  Perhaps I have taken lots of hallucinatory drugs; I'm clearly not justified in holding (1) in the properly basic way under such conditions.  But regardless, the point stands that some set of conditions attach to the belief that (1) is true, and they are the "ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself."  Next we'll see how this ties in with belief in God.

1 - recall Craig's showing versus knowing distinction

Science and Religion Debate (Craig, Plantinga vs Gale, Smith)

Plantinga on God's nature

Continuing with the Plantinga video kick...

Plantinga - Science and Religion: Where the Conflict Really Lies (at Biola)

A Modal Argument for Dualism

Here is Plantinga's paper, "Against Materialism."

Plantinga on the sufficiency of natural theology

"I don't think philosophy can show you one way or the other that there is such person as God. I think there are some pretty good arguments for God's existence (philosophical arguments), but I don't think they are sufficiently strong to support the kind of belief that most Christians actually have." (emphasis mine)

"Alvin Plantinga - American Masters of Apologetics Pt.3."Unbelievable?. Premier Christian Radio: 7/26/2008. Web. 14 Nov 2010.(streamed audio).

Plantinga on Science and Religion

"The point is that a mutation accruing to an organism is random, just as neither the organism nor its environment contains the mechanism or process or organ that causes adaptive mutations to occur.  But clearly a mutation could be both random in that sense, and also intended (and indeed caused) by God.  Hence, the randomness involved in Darwinism does not imply that the process is not divinely guided.  The fact (if it is a fact) that human beings have come to be by way of natural selection operating on random genetic mutation is not at all incompatible with their having been designed by God and created in his image.  Therefore Darwinism is entirely compatible with God's guiding, orchestrating, and overseeing the whole process.  Indeed it's perfectly compatible with the idea that God causes the random genetic mutations that are winnowed by natural selection.  Maybe all of them.  Maybe just some.  Those who claim that evolution shows that humankind or other living things have not been designed apparently confuse the naturalistic gloss on the scientific theory with the theory itself.  The claim that evolution demonstrates that human beings and other living creatures have not—contrary to appearances—been designed, is not a part of or a consequence of the scientific theory as such, but a metaphysical or theological add-on.  Naturalism implies of course that we human beings have not been designed and created in God's image, because it implies that there is no such person as God.  But evolutionary science by itself does not carry this implication.  Naturalism and evolutionary theory together imply the denial of divine design.  But evolutionary theory by itself doesn't have that implication.  It is only evolutionary science combined with naturalism that implies this denial.  Since naturalism all by itself has this implication, it’s no surprise that when you conjoin it with science—or as far as that goes anything else: the complete works of William E. McGonagall, poet and tragedian for example, or the Farmer's Almanac, or the Apostle's Creed—the conjunction will also have this implication [audience laughter]."

Plantinga, Alvin. "Science and Religion, Where the Conflict Really Lies." American Philosophical Association Central Division Conference. 2009. Debate.  (Online Transcript)