The Moorean Shift

G.E. Moore

If I don't know* I'm dreaming, then I don't know if I'm standing up.

Skeptic:
I don't know I'm dreaming.
Therefore, I don't know if I'm standing up

Moorean Shift:
I know that I'm standing up.
Therefore, I know that I'm not dreaming.

"I agree, therefore, with that part of the argument which asserts that if I don't know that I'm not dreaming, it follows that I don't know that I'm standing up, even if I both actually am and think that I am. But this first part of the argument is a consideration which cuts both ways. For, if it is true, it follows that it is also true that if I do know that I am standing up, it follows that I do know that I'm not dreaming. I can therefore just as well argue: since I do know that I'm standing up, it follows that I do know that I'm not dreaming; as my opponent can argue: since you don't that you're not dreaming, it follows that you don't know that you're standing up. The one argument is just as good as the other, unless my opponent can give better reasons for asserting that I don't know that I'm not dreaming, than I can give for asserting that I do know that I'm standing up."  (Moore, G.E. 1959. Philosophical Papers. p. 247)

* "to know" for Moore  is synonymous with "to be certain"

Philosophical Skepticism

This article gives one of the clearest expositions of philosophical skepticism that I've come across to date. "Responding to Skepticism" by Keith DeRose.  Also check out his shorter article, "What is Epistemology?"

Ordinary skepticism

Skepticism holds that some set of claims is unknown or unknowable. I'll draw a rough distinction between philosophical skepticism and ordinary skepticism. Generally, philosophical skepticism operates against a broad set of claims, and leaves open the question of knowing anything at all. On the other hand, ordinary skepticism applies to a more narrow domain such as metaphysics, theology, or non-empirical science. It assumes that we already know something.[1]

At the philosophical level, the debate is anything but settled over what constitutes knowledge, and more interestingly how beliefs are justified. On the other hand, the ordinary skeptic speaks from an epistemological framework to which he is already committed. Thus, if something is not known (let's fold knowledge and justification together for now): it doesn't measure up to whatever standard his framework demands. Likewise, if something is unknowable: it is outside of the bounds of his framework.

So if a skeptic says, "skepticism is the default position," we might simply grant it. Why? Because it doesn't immediately pose a threat to anyone but the skeptic, should he wish to acquire a new belief.  What he really intends to say is, "given my epistemology, skepticism is the default position." It seems at least three types of response are possible:

1. Yes, but granted my epistemology, skepticism is not the default position
2. Actually no, your epistemology does not grant that position [2]
3. I can fulfill your epistemic requirements and thus persuade you to repeal your skepticism

[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/
[2] The first and second responses might involve some specific claim (aliens exist) or a branch of claims (supernatural events)

The default position and the burden of proof

A variety of claims are circulating the internet (and no doubt elsewhere) regarding the title of this post. Michael Shermer claims that skepticism (as an approach to claims) is the default position, so we'll take him at his word and skeptically evaluate his claim. Other atheists, such as George Smith, claim that lack of belief in gods is more akin to a factory default setting for the human brain:

"If the religionist is bothered by the moral implications of calling the uninformed child an atheist, the fault lies with these moral implications, not with the definition of atheism. Recognizing this child as an atheist is a major step in removing the moral stigma attached to atheism, because it forces the theist to either abandon his stereotypes of atheism or to extend them where they are patently absurd." (George Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God)

In future posts, I will take a few chops at these claims to see what's underneath.